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IN THE SUPREME CQU,RT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON,
Plaint~ff

and A ppelloot,

vs.
ROBERT CRAIL, H E N R Y M.
SCHEURN and DANIEL S.
BUSHNELL,

Case No. 9291

Defendants and Respondents.

REPLY OF APPELLANT.
Comes now the Ap·pellant and here rep-lies to Points
II, III and IV of Respondents' Brief.
STATEMENT OF P:OIN·TiS
POINT I
RE:SPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT APPELLANT
CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE THAT ISSUANCE OF THE
STO'CK WAS. NOT AN "ISOL.NTED TRANSACTION" O·N
APPEAL IS IN ERROR.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT TRANiSACTION
WAS EXEMPT AS AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPOR.A:TION
IS IN ERROR AND IS NOT A PRO·PER SUBJECT FOR THIS
APPEAL.
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POINT III
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT CANNO'T QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTO·RY CAUSE OF
ACTION IS SPECIOUS, IN ERROR, AND NOT A PROPER
SUBJECT FOR THIS APPEAL.
POINT IV
THE STIPULATIONS ENTERED INTO AND APPROVED BY T·HE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING UPON
THE RESPONDENTS.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RE1SPONDENTS' CONTENTION THAT APPELLANT
CANNOT RAISE THE ISSUE THAT ISSUANCE OF THE
STOCK WA8 NOT AN "ISOLATED TRANSACTION" O·N
APPEAL IS IN ERRO·R.

In Respondents' Point II, we are told that Appellant
has raised the issue of whe,ther the complained of transaction was "an isolated transaction'' for the first time
on app·e.al. This is not the fact.
·The order of the District Court dismissing Appellant's Se-cond c~ause of Action, which order is the subject
of this appeal, was pursuant to motion of defendants,
and by its terms was based upon consideration of briefs
suhmit'ted to the respective p;arties. In the plaintiff's
reply brief, there fil·ed, the issue of ''an isolated transaction"' was argued.

As to that portio~ of the pre-trial order dated September 28, 1959, (R. 9) (Respondents' Brief P. 16),
counsel for appell'ant moved. t~e ·C:ourt on .O.ctober 12,
1959 that said p~aragraph he stricken ''pursuant. to the
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provisions of 61-1-22, U.C.A. 1953." (R. 13) This motion
was denied 0 ciober 22, 1959. (R. 14) The motion was
again raised· at subsequent pre-trial and taken under
advisen1ent (R. 23), but has never been acted upon except by implication in the eou:rts pre-trial order dated
April25, 1960 (R. 25) and the order of dismissal ap·pealed
from (R. 27).
1

Section 61-1-22, U;C.A., 1953, p·rovides, ''It
shall not be necessary to negative any of the
exemptions or classifications in this ·chapter provided in any complaint, information or indictment
or in any writ or p~roceedings laid ·or brought
under this cha!lter, and the burden of proof of
any such exemption shall be up~on the pa.rty clavm~ng the benefit of such exemption or classvf~ca
tiJon. '' ( emph·asis added)
·This being the law, it did nort appear equitable to impose
U!lOn plaintiff the limitations of the paragraph eomplained of.
However, even if th.e objectionable paragraph is
pernritted to stand, it does not by its language dep·rive
the Appellant of the issue of "isolated transaction."
In the Statement of the ·Case stipulated to by all of
the parties to this appeal, tSupplemental Record, filed
September 27, 19·60, Page 1), it is stipulated as. follows:
''Deeds of ·conveyance were received from
Empire Mining ·Company, an Iowa Corporation,
and W. D. Johnson, in ·consideration for whieh
40,000 shares. of said stock were; issued to W. D.
Johnson, the plainrtiff. Bills of sale were received
from Fred B. Grube and Grube Harman Mining
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Company, a partnership, for which 20,000 shares
of said stock were issued to Fred B. Grube.'' .
In the objectionable p~aragraph in the pre-trial order, the
trial ·court merely brands these two issues of stock as
"a single transaction". The cases cited on Page 12 of
Appellant's original Brief support the proposition that
''an isolated sale means one standing alone, disconnected
from any other.'' The language of the paragraph in
the p,re-tri'al order compels a -conclusion on the part of
the plaintiff that the issue of 40,000 shares of stock to
W. D. Johnson was not "an isolated transaction". If
the Respondents desired to make thaJt claim the burden
was upon them to prove it under 16-1-22, U.C.A., 1953.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT TRANSACTION
WAS EXEMPT AS AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION
IS IN ERROR AND IS NOT A PRO-PER SUBJECT FOR THIS
APPEAL.
Res~pondents

urge in Point Ill of their Brief that
the sale· of 40,000 shares of stock to W. D. Johnson was
exempt for ,th·e re.ason that it was a sale to a corporation.
The.y eite tJl~ trial court's memorandum "Decision"
(Sup:plemental Record filed November 4, 1960) as though
it were conclusive. on this ·factual question and binding
on this Court.
/The trial court made 'and entered this memorandum
after· hearing evidence as to whether the plaintiff was
the real p:arty in interest on the plaintiff's F~rst ·Cause
of Action. The court severely curtailed what evidence
it would hear from the· plaintiff at that time 'and as

'
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it pointed out in its memorandwn, the plaintiff ''produced no evidence of being authorized to take title in
himself for the stock.'' This queS'tion was not fully explored. There vvas no reason for requiring further evidence on that subject, since defendants themselves prepared and issued to the plaintiff herein the s.tock certificates in question. If the issu~ance of them to this plaintiff
was not p.roper, it was incumbent upon defendants to
so show, they having the burden.
Pursuant to this memorandum ''decision'' the respondents prepared, and caused to be signed and entered,
Findings of Fa.ct, ('Sup·plemental Record filed Nov. 4,
1960), the 6th p·aragraph of which stated in part ''At
the time of tha alleged restitution or commencement of
this action, the plaintiff was not the owner of the stock
received from Prudential Oil & Minerals Company.'' To
this finding the plaintiff objected, and upon motion of
plaintiff the entire paragraph was stricken from the
findings of fact, and the trial court ''s judgment there
was confined strictly to the issues of the Plaintiff's
First Cause of Action (general fraud), and the neeessary
facts incident thereto, not to the second cause, now before
this court.
The Appellant is entitled to his day in court in order
to determine, among other things, the fact of ownership
of said 40,000 shares of Prudential stock, under said
second cause of action.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
POINT III
RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT APPELLANT CANNOT QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTORY CAU1SE OF
ACTION IS SPECIOU·S, IN ERROR, AND NOT A PROPER
SUBJECT FOR THI~S APPEAL.

Res·pondents' argument under Point III of their
brief is somewhat comparable to the argument of the
man who was conv~cted of murdering his mother and
father, but urged the court to have mercy on him since
he was an orphan.
That respondents' received valuable eonsideration
for the 40,000 shares of Prudential stock is not denied.
Whether the consideration came from the plaintiff directly or in part from some one else in his behalf, is of
no moment, and may be decided by the trial court. The
sole, material inquiry is, who received the stock and
who possess.ed it at the time of the commencement of
this aJction, all certificates running in favor of the
plaintiff.
A condition precedent to recovery under 61-1-25,
U.~c·.A., 1953, is the· tender back to the seller of the stock.
Only the recipient of the stock, in posse-ssion of the
stock, ~could make such a tender. ~See Prudential Oil & M.
Co., :CraiJl & Scheurn vs. Haml~~, (1960) 277 Fed. 2d,
384, 387 and Rule 17 (a), U.C.A., 1953.
POINT IV.
THE STIPULATIONS ENTERED INTO AND APPROVED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING UPON
THE RESPONDENTS.
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The '~statement of the Case" stipulated to by the
parties and approved by the trial court is binding upon
the respondents. Said stipulated facts clearly state that,
(1) the appellant executed a deed of conveyance in part
consideration for the sale of the 40,000 shares of Prudential stock and (2) the said 40,000 shares of stock
were issued to the appellant. Respondents can not now
be heard to urge a contrary portion of a "memorandum
decision" which was in existence at the time of said stipulation in order to defeat that stipulation. Points III and
IV of Respondents' Brief are improper argument, out of
order and not proper subjects for this appeal. See 50 Am.
Jur., p. 612 and Pasco Holding Company v. Wells, 126
Fla. 339 171, So. 67 4.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully refer to page 13 of our main brief,
under the heading ''·Conclusion''.
The issue of this appe·al is joined in Point I of Appellant's brief and Point I of Respondents' brief. The
remainder of the points raised and argued by respondents are without merit, and can only serve to confuse
and mislead. The letters of the Attorney General do
not treat the points in issue in this cause.
Respectfully submitted,
RAMON M. ·C·HILD and
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
·Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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